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NATURAL HUMAN RIGHTS: THE PERSPECTIVE
OF THE IUS COMMUNE
R. H. Helmholz'
That men and women possess natural human rights is a matter about
which most of us agree. How far those natural rights extend is more
controversial, but it is widely assumed that we hold some rights not
simply because the government of the day concedes them to us. We hold
them because we are human. Natural human rights are enshrined in the
American Constitution, and they have been expressed in numerous
modern forms. For example, in 1948, the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights sought to guarantee the recognition of human rights as
principles that bind all nations,' and the notion that some form of human
rights should be recognized in every part of the world has since been
widely accepted. Our own government has made serious efforts to
ensure their recognition in emerging nations, as well as to secure their
enforcement under established treaties and laws.
The subject has a long history, and it has recently emerged as the topic
of serious historical inquiry. This Article addresses the question raised in
that scholarship: when and how did natural human rights come to be
recognized within the Western legal tradition?
Up until a few years ago, most scholarship on the subject located the
origins of natural rights in the eighteenth century, specifically within the
thought of the Enlightenment era, although natural rights may have been
foreshadowed in the writing of the jurists of the seventeenth century.
Acceptance of natural human rights was, in any event, a product of new
ways of thinking. It is not too much to speak of the emergence of rights
as the result of emancipation from the hand of the past. Before the
Enlightenment, little in the way of natural rights had been recognized.
For example, the 6migr6 Cambridge scholar and an influential figure in
the field, Walter Ullmann, came to the conclusion that "the individual as
a being endowed with indigenous... and independent rights was a thesis
' R.H. Helmholz is the Ruth Wyatt Rosenson Distinguished Service Professor of Law at
the University of Chicago. The author wishes particularly to thank Professor Brian
Tierney for his generosity in reading and commenting on an earlier draft of this article.
1. G. A. Res. 217 (II)(A), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948), in 2 UNITED NATIONS
RESOLUTIONS: SERIES I: GENERAL ASSEMBLY 135 (Dusan Djonovich ed., 1948-49).
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for which we shall look in vain in the Middle Ages.",2 This view is
reflected in much of the modern literature on human rights, as in this
typical statement about the subject's history during the twelfth century
and beyond: "[t]he revival and reception of Roman law hardly
contributed to the cause of the fundamental rights of man."3
The canon law, which held a significant place in European legal
systems prior to the Enlightenment, has also traditionally been widely
regarded as indifferent to the idea of natural human rights. Ensuring
that men and women held orthodox beliefs was the preeminent goal of
the law of the church, and this goal entailed the exclusion of subjective
rights. The church's acceptance of slavery, shared, of course, with the
Roman law, is perhaps the most dramatic example of the church's
indifference to natural rights. It is commonly said, therefore, that the
language of human rights only "entered into philosophical writing in the
seventeenth century in the work of Grotius and Locke. It was first
invoked in practice by the leaders of the French and American
revolutions in the interests of creating a new social and political order.,
4
This traditional view has been challenged during the last twenty years
by a strand of revisionist scholarship. The movement has been led by
Professor Brian Tierney, and he has been joined by able lieutenants.
Together, they have examined the history of human rights and have
found that the concept of natural rights in fact antedated the
Enlightenment. In their view, its true origins are found within the
medieval traditions of the ius commune, the amalgam of Roman and
canon law that governed European legal education up to the time of
codification and controlled much of the legal practice in the courts of
church and state from the twelfth century to the eighteenth.' In a series
2. Walter Ullmann, Historical Introduction to HENRY CHARLES LEA, THE
INQUISITION OF THE MIDDLE AGES 37 (1963); see also Olivia F. Robinson, Crime and
Punishment and Human Rights in Ancient Rome, in LE MONDE ANTIQUE ET LES DROITS
DE L'HOMME 325 (Huguette Jones ed., 1998).
3. PIETER N. DROST, HUMAN RIGHTS AS LEGAL RIGHTS 14 (1951).
4. See HUMAN RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES IN BRITAIN AND IRELAND: A
CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVE 13 (Sydney Bailey ed., 1988).
5. For an introduction, see MANLIO BELLOMO, THE COMMON LEGAL PAST OF
EUROPE 1000-1800 (Lydia G. Cochrane trans., 1995). The following citations to the texts
of the Roman and canon laws are used throughout this Article:
D.1 c.1 DECRETUM GRATIANI, Distinctio 1, canon 1
C.1 q.1 c.1 ------------, Causa 1, quaestio 1, canon 1
DE PEN. , De penitencia
DE CONS. , De consecratione
X 1.1.1 DECRETALES GREGORII IX, Book 1, tit. 1,cap. 1
SEXT. 1.1.1 LIBER SEXTUS, Book 1, tit. 1, cap. 1
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of impressive articles, many of which have been collected into a book
called The Idea of Natural Rights, Tierney argued that the idea of natural
rights did not enter political life "with a clatter of drums and trumpets...
like the American Declaration of Independence or the French
Declaration of the Rights of Man.",6 Instead, "this central concept of
Western political theory first grew into existence almost imperceptibly in
the obscure glosses of the medieval jurists."7 Scholars who have followed
this lead recognize, of course, that the law of the Middle Ages did not
embrace norms and rights identical to those of the twenty-first century.
Most "women's issues," to take the most obvious example, were not
among the human rights the medieval jurists endorsed,' and those jurists
did not confuse natural legal rights with simple desires for a better life, as
is sometimes done in modern society.9 Differences, however, are only to
be expected. They do not undercut the conclusion that the medieval
d.a. dictum ante (in DECRETUM GRATIANI)
d.p. dictum post (in DECRETUM GRATIANI)
gl. ord. glossa ordinaria (standard commentary on texts of Corpus iuris
canonici and Corpus iuris civilis)
s. v. sub verbo (reference to glossa ordinaria or other commentary on a
legal text)
DIG. 1.1.1 DIGESTUM JUSTINIANI, Book 1, tit. 1, lex 1
COD. 1.1.1 CODEX JUSTINIANI, Book 1, tit. 1, lex 1
INST. 1.1.1 INSTITUTIONES JUSTINIANI, Book 1, tit.1, lex 1
6. BRIAN TIERNEY, THE IDEA OF NATURAL RIGHTS: STUDIES ON NATURAL
RIGHTS, NATURAL LAW AND CHURCH LAW 1150-1625 344 (1997).
7. Id. Other explorations of the subject include: ANNABEL S. BRETT, LIBERTY,
RIGHT AND NATURE: INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN LATER SCHOLASTIC THOUGHT (1997);
ARTHUR P. MONAHAN, FROM PERSONAL DUTIES TOWARDS PERSONAL RIGHTS: LATE
MEDIEVAL AND EARLY MODERN POLITICAL THOUGHT, 1300-1600 (1994); John T.
Noonan, Jr., Human Rights and Canon Law, in CANONS AND CANONISTS IN CONTEXT
173 (1997); KENNETH PENNINGTON, THE PRINCE AND THE LAW, 1200-1600:
SOVEREIGNTY AND RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION (1993); G. R. EVANS,
LAW AND THEOLOGY IN THE MIDDLE AGES 85-118 (2002); Paul Hyams, Due Process
Versus the Maintenance of Order in European Law. The Contribution of the lus Commune,
in THE MORAL WORLD OF THE LAW 62, 66-76 (Peter Coss ed., 2000); A. S. McGrade,
Rights, Natural Rights, and the Philosophy of Law, in CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LATER
MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY 738 (Norman Kretzmann et al. eds., 1982); Charles J. Reid, Jr.,
Canonistic Contribution to the Western Rights Tradition: An Historical Inquiry, 33 B.C. L.
REV. 37 (1991); RICHARD TUCK, NATURAL RIGHTS THEORIES: THEIR ORIGIN AND
DEVELOPMENT (1979). See also Alan Harding, Political Liberty in the Middle Ages, 55
SPECULUM 423 (1955) (using a different group of sources).
& See Johan D. van der Vyver, Human Rights in the Twenty-First Century: A Global
Challenge, 8 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 787, 790-94 (1994) (book review).
9. See, e.g., Wiktor Osiatynski, Human Rights for the 21st Century, 2000 ST.-LOUIS-
WARSAW TRANSATLANTIC L.J. 29,42-46 (2000).
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canonists and civilians understood and endorsed the notion that natural
rights existed and could be asserted by individuals.
This Article seeks to contribute to this revisionist strand of scholarship.
It examines the reasons given for the existence of human rights in the
medieval ius commune and tracks their results in legal practice. Broadly
speaking, this Article supports the conclusion that the medieval jurists
did understand and develop the notion that fundamental human rights
existed. These rights did not depend upon a grant by the sovereign, and
they could be exercised in fact. Further examination does, however,
suggest limitations to this view. Most of the revisionist scholarship has
concentrated on demonstrating that the medieval law contained a
vocabulary of human rights and conceded it a place within the ius
commune.'0 Less attention has been paid to the reasons the jurists
provided for the existence of the rights and the qualifications that were
imposed upon the rights as a consequence. Delving further into the
literature of the ius commune, looking at those reasons and the specific
ways that rights were exercised in practice, makes the overall picture
look rather different. When examined more closely, it becomes clear
that the medieval law took a decidedly less individualistic approach to
rights than is common today. In medieval law, rights were based upon
the tenets of natural and divine law, laws that God himself had created
and implanted in men's consciousness. The objective order found in the
natural law did include the grant of natural rights. The reason for the
existence of those rights, however, was not to vindicate human choice, to
promote the sacredness of human life, or to allow men and women to
flourish as they chose." It was to vindicate and promote God's plan for
the world. This was a purportedly objective way of thinking about rights;
it was quite distinct from the subjective approach that is characteristic of
modern thought. The distinction between these two approaches had
important consequences in fact. This Article hopes to clarify these
differences by reviewing several specific examples of the legal rights
found in the traditions of the medieval ius commune.
10. See, e.g., Charles Reid, Jr., Thirteenth-Century Canon Law and Rights: The Word
Ius and Its Range of Subjective Meanings, 30 STUDIA CANONICA 295 (1996). That the
language of natural rights can also be found in Roman law itself is the theme of Charles
Donahue, Jr., lus in the Subjective Sense in Roman law: Reflections on Villey and Tierney,
in 1 A ENNIO CORTESE 506 (2001).
11. See, e.g., CHRISTINE PIERCE, IMMOVABLE LAW, IRRESISTIBLE RIGHTS:
NATURAL LAW, MORAL RIGHTS, AND FEMINIST ETHICS (2000) (discussing the historical
view of natural law in a feminist context).
[Vol. 52:301
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THE RIGHT TO WELFARE
The first example is the right of the poor to sustenance in time of need.
In such circumstances, Professor Tierney concluded, the canonists held
that "the poor had a right to be supported from the superfluous wealth of
the community."12 In traditional Christian thought, there was a moral
duty, of course, upon all persons to give alms as they were able. Charity
held a high place among the virtues.13 As Tierney has convincingly
shown, however, there was more than an endorsement of the merits of
charitable giving in the ius commune. The canon law took the position
that poor men and women could themselves demand to be supported in
case of need. It was a matter of right. The principle extended even to
small children.14 Even though there was nothing like the modern welfare
state in medieval Europe, the ius commune did contain a forerunner of
modem rights to welfare. It established the principle. Modem writers
have simply elaborated upon its foundations and taken its conclusions to
a more advanced and practical level.
Closer examination of the canon law does not overturn this argument.
It does, however, produce a more complicated picture. 5 Almost every
point upon which the argument rests was disputed among the medieval
jurists. For example, none of them supported the position that the poor
were given a direct action, as we would say, to compel the rich to support
them. The poor could not sue the church or the government to secure an
adequate standard of living. Some suggested, however, that the poor
could reach this result indirectly by making use of the procedure known
as denunciatio evangelica. This procedure allowed a poor Christian to
"denounce" a rich man who refused to share his assets with the poor, and
the church would, in turn, compel him to do so by ecclesiastical censure,
and as a last resort, by excommunication." The availability of even this
12. BRIAN TIERNEY, MEDIEVAL POOR LAW: A SKETCH OF CANONICAL THEORY
AND ITS APPLICATION IN ENGLAND 37-38 (1959).
13. See, e.g., DE PEN. D.1 c.77.
14. X 5.11.1; see also Scott Swanson, Rights of Subsistence in the Twelfth and
Thirteenth Centuries: The Case of Abandoned Children and Servants, in PROCEEDINGS OF
THE TENTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF MEDIEVAL CANON LAW 675 (Kenneth
Pennington et al. eds., 2001).
15. Ordinarily, they were supporters of a system of private property. See generally
John F. McGovern, Private Property and Individual Rights in the Commentaries of the
Jurists, A.D. 1200-1500, in IN lURE VERITAS: STUDIES IN CANON LAW IN MEMORY OF
SCHAFER WILLIAMS 131-58 (Steven B. Bowman & Blanche E. Cody eds., 1991).
16. D.47 c.8 s.v. esurientium. A fuller treatment of the canonists is found in GILLES
COUVREUR, LES PAUVRES ONT-ILS DES DROITS? RECHERCHES SUR LE VOL EN CAS
D'EXTRtME NItCESSITI DEPUIS LA CONCORDIA DE GRATIEN (1140) JusQu'A
GUILLAUME D'AUXERRE (t 1231) 108-15 (1961).
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procedure was, however, a contentious issue. Some canonists held that
giving alms was purely a matter of choice for the people affected.
Whatever right the poor might have, it was not one that could be
enforced by direct action in public courts. At the very least, under some
circumstances, a case for an enforceable right to sustenance might be
established under the classical canon law.
Upon what theory did this right rest? Was it an early recognition of
the inherent right of each individual to flourish? The reasons given by
the medieval jurists do not suggest that it was. They did, of course,
mention the biblical precepts in favor of charitable giving. They did
denounce avarice. These beliefs, however, could not be the foundation
of the rights of the poor. 7 The precepts about giving alms were not
obligatory except as to tithes and a few other traditional obligations,
none of which was destined for the poor. When commentators on the
law of the church spoke about the existence of a right to sustenance per
se, they instead rested their discussion upon an argument from natural
law, one they shared with the civilians. 8 Before society was organized,
the argument ran, all things had been held in common. In times of
extreme necessity, that situation recurred. When the worst did happen,
the poor could take from that common mass without being guilty of
theft. 9 Because they were entitled to a share under natural law, the poor
would only be taking what had been theirs anyway, and the breakdown
of society's order would have effectively dissolved the societal regime
under which the riches of other men had been acquired.
The text most commonly used to prove this point came from the
Rhodian sea law, a text commonly inserted in medieval copies of the
Digest.' In a storm, when some cargo must be jettisoned from a ship, if
afterward the ship reaches port safely, all cargo holders have a right to
share proportionately in what remains. This doctrine of admiralty law is
called the general average. The rule requires the sharing of loss
occasioned by extreme conditions. This may seem to be a far-fetched
argument upon which to base a right to sustenance for the poor, but it is
in fact the textual support the commentators most commonly cited. They
17. There were enforceable duties that followed, the most important of which was the
duty to pay tithes. None of the tithe, however, went directly to the poor. Indeed, the law
of the church on this score is not favorable to a canonical poor law. The ancient canons
devoted a fourth part of the tithe to the poor; in the developed classical law, however, that
share was dropped, and all the tithe went to the clergy.
18. GL. ord. ad DIG. 1.1.5 s.v. dominia distincta.
19. G1. ord. ad D.47 c.8 s.v. commune; see also Swanson, supra note 14, at 680-82.
20. See DIG. 14.2.2.
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were attempting to find, in established law, a reliable indication that
under some circumstances the law required a surrender of property in
favor of the unfortunate. There was no soft-hearted talk about the
merits of the poor or the need for distributive justice. Still less was there
any argument that the rich were ordinarily required to give up what they
had in order to promote a human right held by all human beings.
Consequences followed from this way of thinking. The most
significant was a limitation of the right to men and women in danger of
death, as would have been the case during a storm at sea. Under the
doctrines worked out by the jurists, the need had to be extreme before
any goods were considered held in common. Otherwise, taking the
goods of others, even their surplus goods, was still theft. It was rightly
punished. Inequality of wealth was not sufficient to justify invocation of
a right on behalf of the poor. This, however, is not the main point. The
main point is that the canonists did not approach the question by asking
whether the poor deserved to be supported because they were human
beings or because greater equality in the distribution of human wealth
was desirable to meet a need for human flourishing. Canonists asked,
instead, whether there was something in the natural law that would
justify what would otherwise be theft. That they found a source in
natural law is to their credit, but they did not do so in order to guarantee
individual autonomy or to promote humane values. Prohibitions against
begging, for example, were not regarded as violations of the human
rights of the poor.2'
It is of course true that modern law does not often grant the poor a
"direct" action to sue the rich to protect their own interests, and
commentators have ceased speculating on the reach of the law of theft in
circumstances of extreme need. Nevertheless, American constitutional
law does recognize the existence of human rights of the poor in a variety
of ways. Constitutional law prevents the poor from being disadvantaged
in travel, litigation, and receipt of welfare benefits. 22 Protecting the
welfare of the most disadvantaged citizens is regarded as a
"fundamental" interest in the law.23 Laws that fail to take the welfare of
the poor into account are regarded with particular suspicion. Thus, a
21. See, e.g., ROBERT JOTIE, POVERTY AND DEVIANCE IN EARLY MODERN
EUROPE 100-04 (1994).
22. See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374-83 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254,261-66 (1970); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-31 (1969).
23. See generally Frank I. Michelman, Welfare Rights in a Constitutional Democracy,
1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 659.
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different spirit pervades American law than that which is found in the ius
commune.
THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM IN MARRIAGE
The second example comes from the medieval law of marriage. Here,
the contribution of the ius commune to the development of natural
human rights was the establishment, at least in principle, of the right of
men and women to choose for themselves whom they would marry. This
view may be regarded as a forerunner of the modern right vindicated by
Loving v. Virginia,24 the case in which the U.S. Supreme Court struck
down a state statute prohibiting interracial marriages. In Loving, the
Court declared that "[m]arriage is one of the 'basic civil rights of man,'
fundamental to our very existence and survival." '
Some may think this "right" was made up out of whole cloth, but in
fact it had definite antecedents in the medieval law. The ius commune
recognized a human right to freedom of choice in marriage, and it took
this position in circumstances opposed by the normal assumptions of
society. In the medieval context, the family - rather than a statute like
the one at issue in Loving - normally presented the greatest obstacle to
free choice on the part of the young people involved. Arranged
marriages were common, and the line between an arranged marriage and
a coerced marriage was a very thin one. No doubt, in most circumstances
parental authority would have been hard to resist because it was a
legitimate authority and, naturally, deserving of respect.
The ius commune nonetheless set its face against coerced marriages.
The Roman Law Codex contained an imperial rescript declaring that all
marriages should be free.26 Penalties could lawfully be attached to
exercise of the right to marry, or to remain unmarried, only under very
limited conditions.2V Similarly, Gratian's Decretum 8 and the Gregorian
Decretals29 stated squarely, "No one is to be joined to another [in
marriage] except by free will."' Marriages entered into under coercion
24. 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1966).
25. Id. at 12.
26. COD. 8.39.2.
27. COD. 5.1.5. Bartolus said that any penalty, however small, was void. See
COMMENTARIA ad DIG. 45.1.134, no. 4 ("Dic quod omnis pena conventionalis
quantumcumque modica non valet.").
28. d.p. C. 31 q. 2.
29. X 4.1.29.
30. d.p. C. 31 q. 2 ("His auctoritatibus evidenter ostenditur, quod nisi libera
voluntate, nulla est copulanda alicui.").
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could be dissolved under the canon law if the coercion had been strong
enough to move a "constant man" or a "constant woman.",3' Despite the
legal force the canon law routinely ascribed to oaths, persons who had
sworn an oath to marry were only to be warned to fulfill their oath; they
were not to be compelled.32 Although the realities of life in medieval
society doubtless prevented the canon law's freedom from becoming
fully realized, the canon law of marriage was, in theory, intended to
create "[a] giant democracy in which everyone might marry anyone."33
If it can be taken as proved that the ius commune envisioned a right or
freedom to marry, as these texts suggest, the natural question is why it
did so. Upon what foundation did the right depend? When one
examines the law and commentaries, one quickly finds that the reason
most often given was very simple: "[u]nwilling marriages usually have
bad results."' That phrase, included in Gratian's Decretum, became a
kind of refrain among jurists who sought to give a justification for the
right not to be coerced into marrying. They repeated it on innumerable
occasions. In all canonists' discussions of what lay behind freedom in
marriage, they said nothing about the dignity of the individual or the
centrality of individual "life-choices" for human happiness. To the
contrary, human happiness was rarely mentioned.
What, then, were the "bad results" to which coerced marriages usually
led? A review of the commentaries has revealed two such results. The
first was that forced unions easily led to sin, specifically the sin of
adultery, because spouses who had no affection for the persons they had
been forced to marry would be easily tempted to commit adultery.35 The
birth of legitimate children, one of the goods of marriage, would also be
rendered more difficult by the fact of coercion, or so it was assumed. 6 In
other words, the objective needs of church and society would be
endangered by coercion in marriages. The second reason was that forced
marriages perverted the symbolism of the marriage bond. Marriage, to
use the words of the Book of Common Prayer, symbolized "the mystical
31. X 4.1.28.
32. X 4.1.17.
33. See Noonan, supra note 7, at 430-31. For further commentary, see Charles J.
Reid, Jr., "So It Will Be Found That the Right of Women in Many Cases Is of Diminished
Condition": Rights and the Legal Equality of Men and Women in Twelfth and Thirteenth-
Century Canon Law, 35 LOYOLA L.A. L. REv. 471,491-98 (2002).
34. d.a. C.31 q.2 q.1. ("[Qiuia invitae nuptiae solent malos proventus habere.").
35. C.31 q.2 c.3.
36. Panormitanus, Commentaria lists this reason as separate from the prior reason.
PANORMITANUS, COMMENTARIA ad X 4.1.14, nos. 7-8.
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union that is betwixt Christ and his Church."37  The institution of
marriage was meant to be a union founded upon freedom, not force, just
as was the union between the church and its founder. Therefore, the
commentators said, the law should require that marriages themselves
reproduce the freedom that was essential to the nature of the church.
These reasons cannot seem very compelling today. One might even be
tempted to say that they "miss the point" of the rule guaranteeing
freedom to marry, or one might suppose that they provided cover for
what must have been the "real" reasons. The inescapable fact, however,
is that they were the reasons; no others were given. If one attempts to
take what the church said seriously, as one should,38 then the conclusion
must be that the right to marital freedom was based upon a desire to seek
and fulfill objective goals found within the law of the church. The
voluntary nature that was said to inhere in the Christian religion and the
avoidance of sin were "givens" in the ius commune. These "givens" were
the justifications that provided substance to the legal right to choose a
marriage partner free from coercion. The aspirations for personal
autonomy of the young people involved had very little to do with this
particular guarantee.
Again, consequences followed from this way of thinking about the
subject. When the right to marry came into conflict with other goals of
the law, the right to marry more easily gave way. In other words, the
objective nature of the right to marry led to its limitation. There were
several examples. Most prominently, if a vow to lead a life of chastity
preceded the choice to marry, the right to marry was lost. Instead, one
would be compelled to fulfill the prior vow.39 If the opposite situation
occurred, that is, if the marriage had come first, the rule was not applied
so rigorously; exceptions were created, seemingly induced by the belief
that monastic life was a higher calling than marriage. Another example
was recognition of a parent's right to disinherit a child who took
advantage of the freedom to marry. If the child acted against the express
wishes of the father, the child incurred "the vice of ingratitude" and
could be disinherited, although the ordinary rule in the ius commune
37. The Form of Solemnization of Matrimony, in BOOK OF COMMON PRAYER 300
(1928).
38. See generally D. L. d'Avray, Peter Damian, Consanguinity and Church Property,
in INTELLECTUAL LIFE IN THE MIDDLE AGES: ESSAYS PRESENTED TO MARGARET
GIBSON, 71-80 (Lesley Smith & Benedicta Ward eds., 1992) (examining the church's
prohibition of consanguineous marriages in medieval Europe).
39. C.27 q.1 c.
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allowed children to take a share of the parent's estate.4° Thus, the law
recognized that the freedom to marry should not become a constitutional
trump card, justifying defiance of the legitimate authority of a father.
Finally, marriage between a Christian and a non-Christian was
prohibited.4' Indeed, if it were contracted de facto, it was invalid de iure.
The canonists reasoned that such a union would be a poor symbol of the
unity between Christ and his church. Hence, the freedom to marry was
restricted by the overriding goals of the church itself. In practice, the
freedom to marry was something less than a natural right according to
the modem understanding of the term.
THE RIGHT TO VOTE
The third example of a modern right that was found in the medieval
ius commune is the right to vote. It may seem surprising that the
medieval ius commune made any contribution to the law of elections, but
in fact it did. Indeed, the modem law of elections can be traced back to
the system the medieval canonists developed for choosing bishops,
abbots, and many humbler offices within the church. The canon law
called for all members of the body who were to be governed by a leader
to be brought together and for each person to cast a vote. From this
system arose the ius eligendi, the right to participate and to have one's
vote counted. It was also described as a potestas eligendi or a libertas
eligendi by the commentators, 42 these terms demonstrating that the right
to take part in capitular governance had "a remarkably subjective
quality., 43  Safeguards were created in the canon law to protect the
exercise of the right - principally, a guarantee that the person holding the
right would receive adequate summons and notice of the meeting, lest
the right be rendered ineffective. The jurists spoke of freedom in the
exercise of the right, comparing it with the freedom to enter into
marriage44 The franchise was, therefore, a protected right under the ius
commune.
Although exploring the medieval commentaries undoubtedly
contributes to understanding the origins of human rights, when one looks
at the details, the apparently subjective quality of this right seems to
40. See, e.g., HOSTIENSIS, SUMMA AUREA, Bk. IV, tit. De matri. No. 27 (Venice
1564) ("Quicquid leges dicant, incurrit tamen filia vitium ingratitudinis nisi voluntati patris
consentiat.").
41. C.28 q.1 c.15.
42. X 1.6.52-53; X 3.9.3.
43. See Reid, supra note 7, at 68.
44. GL ord. ad X 1.6.23 s. v. metuehant.
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disappear. Why did the right exist? Hostiensis, one of the most
prominent of the thirteenth century canonists, defined elections as "the
calling of a suitable person to a dignity, following the canonical order."45
He emphasized the procedural order and the suitability of the person
called, not the exercise of a right by the electors. For instance, the
electors could not choose just anyone. Their choice was limited and
subject to reversal by the judgment of their ecclesiastical superior,
typically the archbishop. Indeed, if one of the electors knowingly voted
for an unsuitable candidate, that elector lost the right to vote in the
election.46
One of the main procedural rules in the law of elections held that all
electors had to meet at the same time and in the same place. The
election was to be a consultative and joint decision, although the votes
themselves were to be made secretly. What stood behind this rule?
According to Hostiensis, if the electors were allowed to cast their ballots
singly and separately, such a system would offend the Holy Spirit, who
presided over every canonical election and who "did not love division or
schism."47 His proof was the evidence from Acts 2:1, recording that the
apostles, "when the day of Pentecost was fully come, were all with one
accord in one place." ''4 In other words, the ordinary canonical election
should imitate that biblical meeting insofar as possible. The electors
must meet together and await guidance from the Holy Spirit. The canon
law, thus, did not envision the election primarily as a matter of voters
exercising their individual rights. The form of their meeting was dictated
by an early example and all but excluded a concept of meaningful
subjective rights.
Concrete consequences followed this way of thinking about the ius
eligendi. The exclusion of the laity from all canonical elections was of the
most immediate significance to many at the time. The process by which
they were excluded illustrates the fragility of the right. Either by
privilege or prescription, by the eleventh century, many laymen had
established a prescriptive right to take a part in the election of their
bishops. Such a prescriptive right was not contrary to the ius antiquum of
the church, which held that elections were to be made per clerum et
populum.49  The classical canon law took the opposite approach,
however. Either as a matter of policy, textual interpretation, or even, in
45. SUMMA AUREA, Lib. I, tit. De electione, no. I (emphasis supplied).
46. X 1.6.25.
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the case of Innocent IV, natural law itself, the canon law held that the
laity's pretended right to participate in canonical elections was void. Lay
participation would, in fact, invalidate an election under the view at
which the canonists arrived. ° If the ius eligendi was regarded as a right in
the canon law, therefore, it was not what we would call a natural human
right. What was most important for the medieval canonists was
discovering and following God's plan for the church. That plan, they
said, excluded the laity from taking any but an acclamatory part in the
choice of their chief pastors. Individual rights, even the rights of great
antiquity, had to yield to the institutional needs of the church and to the
right ordering of society.
THE RIGHT TO RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
The fourth example, a good example of the ancestor of a modern right,
is that of religious freedom, the right to choose whether or not to adhere
to a particular faith. Many modern readers may find it quite astonishing
that the medieval church and the Roman and canon laws contained any
mention of this basic human right. The Spanish Inquisition seems a more
apt representative of the church's policy. However, that is not so. The
canon law most definitely stated a principle that closely resembles the
modern right. An ancient text incorporated into Gratian's Decretum
proclaimed that no one was to be brought to the Christian faith by
force.51 A decretal letter of Pope Clement III, incorporated into the
Decretals of Gregory IX, declared that no unwilling person was to be
compelled to come to the baptismal font. 2 An imperial decree placed in
the Roman law Codex stated that Jews were not to be molested or
persecuted in the exercise of their religion.53 Persuasion, not force, would
be the means by which the Christian religion would be spread throughout
the world. The point was decisively and repeatedly stated in the ius
commune. 4 A human right to religious freedom existed.
What lay behind acceptance of this important principle of religious
liberty? In their treatment of it, the medieval canonists focused on the





54. See generally Pier Giovanni Caron, Non asperis sed blandis verbis ad fidem sunt
aliqui provocandi, in I DIRiTri FONDAMENTALI DELLA PERSONA UMANA ET LA
LIBERTA RELIGIOSA 397 (1985); Herbert Grundmann, Freiheit als Religioses, Politisches
und Personliches Postulat im Mittelalter, 183 HiSTORISCHE ZEITSCHRIFr 23 (1957).
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baptism. They discouraged the use of force in baptism because force was
inconsistent with the character of the Gospel. But what if it happened?
What if force was nonetheless used? In discussing the question of the
effectiveness of forced baptism, they drew a distinction, one that seems
to have been taken from the Roman law, between different forms of
compulsion. In the Roman law, if a person entered into a contract
without any volition to do so, as when unconscious or insane, or in cases
in which the person's hand was forcibly guided by someone else, the
transaction was invalid. In those circumstances, no affirmative volition
existed." If, however, a person made a contract because he was placed
under fear of dire consequences if he refused - say, by the threat of a
lawsuit or loss of an inheritance - then the contract was valid.56 There
might be a separate action against the coercer on other grounds, but the
contract itself would be enforceable. In such circumstances, the rule
stated that "[c]oerced volition is still volition."57 Therefore, a stipulatio
entered into under duress was legally valid.
The canonists drew this same distinction with regard to baptism. If
one were forcibly baptized, the baptism was invalid. Such a baptism
lacked any volition on the part of the person baptized. If the person,
however, had been offered a choice between baptism and something else,
such as the loss of his property or deportation, and had chosen the
former option, the baptism was valid. The person baptized would have
become subject to the laws of the church. "Coerced volition is still
volition, 59 even in the choice of a religious faith. Of course, the canon
lawyers recognized that forced baptism might have no beneficial effect
on the person involved. God knows our hearts, and the heart of the
person converted by force will not truly turn to God. To state it
formally, the baptism would lack efficacy. A lack of efficacy, however,
did not indicate a lack of validity. The person baptized would still be
forced to conform to the dictates of the Christian religion.
What is missing from the discussion of the canonists is attention to the
rights of the individual being baptized. If validly baptized, the person
had no choice as to his or her religious affiliation. People baptized as
55. See DIG. 4.2.21; gl. ord. ad DIG. 23.2.22 s.v. invitos.
56. These threats were contrasted with threats of death or enslavement in developed
Roman law. If these threats were backed with the ability to carry them out, the
transaction was treated as invalid. See generally REINHARD ZIMMERMANN, THE LAW OF
OBLIGATIONS: ROMAN FOUNDATIONS OF THE CIVILIAN TRADITION 650-54 (1990).
57. DIG. 4.2.21.5.
58. INST. 4.13.1.
59. Gl. ord. ad X 1.40.2 s.v. coactus.
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infants, adults validly baptized who later changed their minds, and
persons baptized under some variety of "conditional coercion" were
essentially out of luck.6° They had exhausted their religious freedom and
could be compelled to adhere to the church's law. Under classical canon
law, that compulsion was effected by the threat of a particularly horrible
form of capital punishment. The analysis that yielded this result was very
far removed from recognizing the "sacred rights of the person" that have
sometimes been extolled as among the core teachings of the Christian
religion. The Spanish jurists were able to propose, without blushing, that
the religious freedom of the native peoples in the New World consisted
of a human right to become Christians.61 Once exercised, it included no
right to convert back.
Few of us would assent to such an understanding of religious freedom
in baptism, much less admire it. Modern distaste for this view fails to
explain how the jurists of the medieval ius commune adopted it after
making such an auspicious start in stating a principle of religious
freedom. The explanation is that they took an objective view of the
effect of baptism. To them, baptism was a fact.62 Only in circumstances
where the person being baptized had clearly been unwilling to proceed
was a baptism considered invalid. That result was based on the entire
absence of the person's will, not on a violation of his or her right to make
a free choice in matters of religious faith.63 Taking an objective view, it
simply could not be true that baptism might be valid one day and invalid
the next. Once one had chosen Christianity, it was a final choice. One
could not take the benefits without the burdens any more than a man can
renounce the fact that he has fathered a child.
Today, we would distinguish: a father cannot renounce the child
because the rights of a third person have intervened, but the canonists
did not recognize this distinction. They may have considered God to
have been the real party in interest, the party whose interests could not
be ignored simply because an individual happened to change his mind. It
was an objective way of considering the subject of religious choice, one
much less concerned with preserving human freedom as a basic right
60. GL. ord. ad C.15 q.1 c.1 s.v. compellitur. Marriage was treated as a special case in
the canon law.
61. See JUAN GOTI ORDE$JANA, DEL TRATADO DE TORDESILLAS A LA DOCrRINA
DE LOS DERECHOS FUNDAMENTALES EN FRANCISCO DE VITORIA 346-52 (1999).
62. E.g., HOSTIENSIS, SUMMA AUREA, Bk. 3, tit. De baptismo, no 16 ("Ratio quia
character semel receptus amitti non potest.").
63. See PANORMITANUS, COMMENTARIA ad X 3.42.3 § Item quaeritur, no. 7. The
character of baptism was held to be indelible so that restitutio in integrum would not be
available, although it would be available in some ordinary transactions.
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than is true today. This is the reason that, although one can discern a
kind of progenitor of modern religious liberty in the classical canon law,
it is very hard to see in it a subjective human right in the modern sense.
Unless this difference is taken into account, the classical canonists must
seem to have been confused - or worse. They advocated religious
freedom on the one hand, but, on the other hand, they also advocated
putting men and women to death who sought to take advantage of it.
THE RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL
The fifth example is important and fundamental in the progressive
recognition of human rights: the right to a fair trial, the right not to be
condemned without due process of law, and the right not to have one's
property taken without a lawful judgment. The history of this subject has
been explored in a well-written book by Kenneth Pennington.64 The
book shows convincingly that under ordinary circumstances, the right to
due process was an accepted norm in the ius commune. The right was
strengthened during the Middle Ages by the virtual exclusion from
practice of proof by notoriety, which had been permitted under some
circumstances in earlier canonical thought. Affirmative proof in a court
of law was thus required before a defendant could lawfully be deprived
of liberty or property. Therefore, something very similar to the modern
right to due process existed within the ius commune, and it is evident
from the records of trials in medieval courts that this right was one that
individuals involved in litigation could assert. It was not merely an
ideal.65
What reasons did the medieval commentators give for the existence of
this right? Why did a man or woman have a claim to be summoned
properly and then allowed to present a defense in response to an
accusation that he or she had committed a crime? Did this grow out of a
belief in the inherent rights of each individual to personal autonomy?
Such a view seems natural to modern commentators, but it was not the
justification the canonists gave for the requirement of summons and fair
trial. Instead, the canonists cited the story of Adam and Eve from the
64. See PENNINGTON, supra note 7, at 149-64. For the presumption of innocence in
the ius commune, see Kenneth Pennington, Innocent Until Proved Guilty: The Origins of a
Legal Maxim, 3 A Ennio Cortese 59 (Domenico Maffei & Italo Birocchi eds., 2001).
65. See LINDA FOWLER-MAGERL, ORDINES IUDICIARII AND LIBELLI DE ORDINE
IUDICIORUM (FROM THE MIDDLE OF THE TWELFTH TO THE END OF THE FIFTEENTH
CENTURY) 23-24 (1994); Kenneth Pennington, Due Process, Community, and the Prince in
the Evolution of the Ordo ludiciarius, 9 RiVISTA INTERNAZIONALE DI DIRITTO COMUNE
9, 20-24 (1998).
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Book of Genesis. 6 When Adam ate the fruit of the tree, something God
had expressly forbidden him to do, Adam was not punished summarily.
Instead, "the Lord God called unto Adam, and said unto him, [w]here art
thou?" 67 Then, God asked Adam to say whether he had eaten of the
forbidden fruit and even listened to Adam's attempt at self-justification
and his effort to shift the blame to someone else.
The canonists saw the origins of the right to a fair trial in this first
event of human history. God knew that Adam was guilty of the crime. It
could not have been otherwise. He also knew that Adam could offer no
adequate justification. Nonetheless, God took the trouble to summon
Adam by calling out to him in the Garden of Eden. God listened
patiently, if briefly, to what Adam had to say in an attempt to excuse
himself. According to the canonists, human judges were bound to do the
same in their courts. In other words, the canonists recognized these
rights, not because of any merit in defendants or any inherent right they
possessed as human beings, but because the biblical example required
it.6 God himself had established an ordo iuris, which men must follow.
Defendants must be given, therefore, a proper summons before being
tried. They must be informed of the crime of which they stand accused,
and they must be given an opportunity to be heard in self-defense. Even
if their guilt was patent, they must have the chance to offer pleas in
mitigation.
Today, of course, this kind of reasoning from a biblical text seems
quite fanciful, even mildly amusing. One is tempted to dismiss it as
nonsense or simply another "proof text" produced to add a religious tone
to a rule arrived at for other and better reasons. So it seems. The
inescapable fact, however, is that the canonists themselves preferred this
explanation to an explanation based upon individual rights. It is not that
they added this proof text to other reasons. It was their reason. And this
preference had consequences. Another relevant biblical incident came
from the eighteenth book of Genesis. Hearing accounts of the sins
prevalent in Sodom and Gomorrah, God said, "I shall descend and see
whether they have done according to the clamor that has come unto
66. See generally R. H. Helmholz, The Bible in the Service of the Canon Law, 70 CHi.-
KENT L. REV. 1557, 1573-78 (1995).
67. Genesis 3:9.
68. E.g., SEBASTIANUS VANTIUs, TRACTATUS DE NULLITATIBUS PROCESSUUM AC
SENTENTIARUM, tit. Ex defectu citationis, no. 7 (Venice 1567), f. 186 ("Et hac solemnitate
Deus omnipotens uti voluit ... non quod aliquid sibi foret absconditum, sed ut iudicibus
seculi in sententiis proferendis exemplum daret.").
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me. '69 From this, the canonists concluded that the ordo iuris should
encompass proceedings based upon clamor, or fama publica, the
technical term they developed.70 It was a violation of due process to
summon a man before a judge without an accuser or the equivalent of
probable cause. The due process requirement could be fulfilled if the
clamor were sufficient to meet the standard established by God himself
in Genesis 18:21. This way of thinking comported with the most
notorious example of what now seems like a gross violation of
defendants' rights - the denial of legal representation to men accused of
crimes. The ius commune shared this rule with the English common
law.7' Both systems regarded the intervention of a lawyer in place of the
accused as a barrier to discovery of the truth and the prosecution of
crime. God's example showed this.
If one accepted the Old Testament as an accurate manifestation of
God's will and regarded the discovery of the truth and the punishment of
the guilty as the overriding goals of the criminal law, as the medieval
jurists did, these conclusions seemed to follow almost as a matter of
course. Medieval jurists thought objectively about the subject of
defendants' rights to a fair trial. Defendants had a right to due process,
and they could invoke it against judges who ignored the ordo iuris, but at
the same time the jurists insisted that it should not become a means of
impeding the orderly prosecution of crime.72 In the jurists' minds, the
right to a fair trial never became an end in itself. The medieval right to
due process was not based upon the inherent dignity of the individuals
involved, in the Garden of Eden or anywhere else. Still less did it
provide a way of escaping punishment for the inhabitants of Sodom and
Gomorrah. The right was based upon an assessment of the needs of
justice, as those needs were shown in the Bible and deduced from the
tenets of natural law.
OTHER FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
The pattern revealed by examining the five fundamental human rights
just discussed was repeated in other areas of the ius commune. The law
recognized the existence of human rights, and the jurists sought to ensure
that individuals would have the ability to invoke them. The rights were
69. Genesis 18:21.
70. See gl. ord. ad C.2 q.1 c.20 s. v. inquirat; X 5.1.24.
71. C.5 q.3 c.2; gl. ord. ad X 5.1.15 s.v. criminali.
72. X 5.39.35; see also Richard M. Fraher, The Theoretical Justification for the New
Criminal Law of the High Middle Ages "Rei Publicae Interest, Ne Crimina Remaneant
Impunita," 1984 ILL. L. REV. 577 (1984); Hyams, supra note 7, at 76-86.
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not considered simply as ways of giving counsel and guidance to
legislators and judges; they were not optional. However, the reasons the
jurists gave for the existence of these rights were not based on their
regard for the inherent dignity of the human person. They found their
reasons in texts taken from Roman law, natural law, and the Bible - texts
that suggested that the needs of human society would be promoted by
the observance of the rights. Thus, it followed that human rights could
not enjoy pride of place in the ius commune, as they do so prominently in
modern law. This theme is found throughout the medieval law, as
illustrated by the following three examples.
A. A Right to Self-Preservation
The canon law followed the Roman law in recognizing the existence of
a basic right of self-defense against attack. This right was said to stem
from natural law itself,73 a position endorsed at the very start of Gratian's
Decretum.4 A right to preserve one's life was a right recognized "by
every law."75 Indeed, it antedated the formation of human society and
the creation of civil law. The right was one of those natural instincts that
men shared with all animals.76 Human beings had the right to defend
themselves and their property from attack. Clerics themselves had the
right, despite a general prohibition against their bearing arms. The
importance of this right was apparent because even men in holy orders
had the right to use force to preserve their own life and goods. If they
killed another in self-defense, they were not to be deprived of their
orders, although some texts suggested that they could be required to
undergo penance for a time.77 Moreover, some jurists thought that they
should be disqualified from ascending further in the church's hierarchy.8
The right to protect one's person and property gave rise to the concept of
a "just war" in scholastic thought and to a considerable body of casuistic




76. See BARTOLUS, COMMENTARIA ad DIG. 1.1.3, no. 5 ("[Q]uod quidem convenit
animalibus brutis.").
77. D.50 c.36.
7& See Rufinus of Bologna, Summa Decretorum ad D.50, c.5 (H. Singer ed., 1963)
(1902).
79. See FREDERICK H. RUSSELL, THE JUST WAR IN THE MIDDLE AGES 41-44, 95-
100 (1975). See generally James V. Schall, On the Justice and Prudence of This War, 51
CATH. U. L. REV. 1 (2001).
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From the beginning, however, this right was limited under the ius
commune, as it has largely remained to this day. The desire to take
vengeance against a man's enemies was strong in medieval society, and
the right to self-protection offered a possible means of justifying that
desire. The jurists recognized the danger. They saw that the right could
conflict with the ordo iuris they followed and the overall needs of church
and society for order. Accordingly, they restricted the right, finding
ample support in the Roman and canon laws' For example, a text in the
Codex was read as restricting the use of force to protect one's property; it
extended only to using the amount of force commensurate to that used
against the person being attacked." The force used in self-defense must
also be applied immediately, without an interval, and only used in order
to recover property, not for the sake of vengeance."' Similarly, the right
to defend oneself could be invoked only against a private attacker, not
against public authorities acting in the execution of their duties.83 Thus,
the jurists who commented upon these texts placed greater emphasis on
preserving order in society than on the vindication of personal rights.
B. A Right to Proportionality in Punishment
Among the most controversial human rights today is that which
entitles those who violate the criminal law to fair and equal treatment in
being sentenced. The underlying right is given concrete expression at
several places in the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which
prohibits "excessive bail," "excessive fines," and "cruel and unusual
punishment."" Some state constitutions recognize this principle of
proportionality in so many words." The principle of fair and equal
treatment in sentencing even evokes an echo, though perhaps a distorted
one, in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines." However, recognition of
80. See STEPHAN KUTrNER, KANONISTISCHE SCHULDLEHRE VON GRATIAN BIS
AUF DIE DEKRETALEN GREGORS IX 334-79 (1935).
81. GI. ord. ad COD. 8.4.1, s.v. moderatione.
82. COD. 8.4.1; gl. ord. ad id. s.v. recti and ad defendendam.
83. BARTOLUS, COMMENTARIA ad DIG. 1.1.3, no. 2 (citing DIG. 9.2.45.4 and COD.
8.4.1 as seemingly contrary texts and resolving the contradiction by construing the second
as applying to cases of force used by public authorities).
84. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
85. E.g., IND. CONST. § 16 ("All penalties shall be proportioned to the nature of the
offense."); MAINE CONST. art. I, § 9 ("Sanguinary laws shall not be passed; all penalties
and punishments shall be proportioned to the offence."); N.H. CONST. art. XVIII ("All
penalties ought to be proportioned to the nature of the offense.").
86. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553- 3673 (2001). See generally U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL (2001). For a critical view, see Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing
Guidelines: A Plea for Less Aggregation, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 901 (1-991).
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this particular right is now at war with measures thought to be required
by the extent of crime in our society; policies such as "three strikes and
you're out" and "zero tolerance" point in the opposite direction."' As a
result, the issue of equal treatment in punishment has become a
contentious area of the law."
This issue also has a history in the ius commune. At several points, the
texts and related medieval commentaries endorsed the regime of
proportional punishment. "Delicts of equal character call for equal
punishment," proclaimed the glossa ordinaria to a text in the Roman law
Codex.89 Equal delicts are to be subject to equal penalties, stated the
glossa ordinaria to Gratian's Decretum.9° The jurists found the reason for
this rule in the equality of all persons before the law.9' The Bible itself
stated the principle, providing that God was no respecter of persons.
2
He punishes us, but never arbitrarily. He does so in accord with the
nature of our acts.93 Job was a special case. Human judges should follow
God's example. The Gregorian Decretals stated it,94 and the rule was
included in the title, De regulis iuris, of the Liber sextus.9 In judging,
there should be no respecting of persons.
Like the other rights in the ius commune, however, this right was
subject to many qualifications. 96 The very glossa ordinaria to the text of
the canon law endorsing the principle ends its treatment with a list of
exceptions, including one for persons who hold offices described as
"dignitaries." If these "dignitaries" were guilty of an offense, they should
87. Francis A. Allen, A Matter of Proportion, 4 GREEN BAG 2D 343, 348 (2001)
(focusing on the problems of "zero tolerance").
88. The contentious nature of the issue of equal treatment is explored in Andrew von
Hirsch, Penal Theories, in THE HANDBOOK OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 659 (Michael
Tonry ed., 1998).
89. GL ord. ad COD. 1.3(6).30(31) s.v. par facinus ("Nota aequale delictum aequalem
exigere poenam.").
90. G. ord. ad C.24 q.1 c.21 s.v. scelaratius ("Et in delicto aequali propinquas esse
poenas.").
91. COD. 12.19.12.4.
92. Acts 10:34; Romans 2:11.
93. Hosea 12:2; 1 Peter 1:17.
94. X 5.1.17.
95. SEXT. 5.[13].12.
96. See K. W. Nrrr, Ohne Ansehung der Person: Eine Exegese der 12. Regula iuris im
Liber Sextus und der Glossa ordinaria des Johannes Andreae hierzu, 5 RIVISTA
INTERNAZIONALE DI DIRITTO COMMUNE 23 (1994); John Van Engen, 'God Is No
Respecter of Persons': Sacred Texts and Social Realities, in INTELLECTUAL LIFE IN THE
MIDDLE AGES: ESSAYS PRESENTED TO MARGARET GIBSON 243,252-64 (Lesley Smith &
Benedicta Ward eds., 1992).
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be treated more leniently than other men in the assignment of penalties.97
The canonists thought, for example, that shameful punishment of the
clergy might easily redound to the detriment of the clerical order itself.
To avoid this consequence, the canonists qualified the principle of
proportionality so that it could take account of this overriding need of
the church. The ius commune thus recognized a right to equal treatment
in penal law, but it also accepted exceptions where a greater good
seemed to require them.
C. A Right to Privacy
A famous article by Brandeis and Warren asserted that the law
contained different remedies designed to protect private personal
interests; the various strands simply needed to be drawn together and
recognized as a general right of privacy.9" Had they wished, they could
have drawn support for their characterization of prior law from the
medieval ius commune. Under several headings, it protected rights of
privacy, but did not group these rights under a unifying rubric. For
example, the ius commune prohibited public officials from requiring men
and women to reveal their secret faults. As the jurists stated
emphatically, no one should be compelled to reveal his own shame.99
Therefore, it became a maxim of the canon law that "the church does not
take notice of what is hidden," at least in its public courts. ° Similarly,
the jurists read the Roman law of iniuria to prohibit revelation of the
private faults of another person, even if the speaker revealed the truth.
Criminal or civil liability against the speaker followed.""° By such
measures, individual privacy was given legal protection in the ius
commune.
As with the other rights explored in this Article, the reasons given by
the commentators for recognizing these rights were quite different from
97. G. ord. ad SEXT. 5.[13].12 s.v. in iudiciis (citing SEXT. 1.14.2) ("Item est habenda
acceptio personarum in impositione pene, quia quantum ad impositionem pene mitius
agitur cum persona constituta in dignitate quam cum alia persona.").
98. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193, 213-1.4 (1890); see also DAVID FLAHERTY, PRIVACY IN COLONIAL NEW ENGLAND
(1972) (examining the right to privacy in an historical context).
99. E.g., JULIUS CLARUS, PRACTICA CRIMINALIS, Quaest. 45, no. 9 ("Nemo tenetur
prodere seipsum, quia nemo tenetur detegere turpitudinem suam.").
100. For a fuller discussion, see Stephan Kuttner, Ecclesia de Occultis Non ludicat:
Problemata ex Doctrina Poenali Decretistarum et Decretalistarum, in ACTA CONGRESSUS
IURIDICI INTERNATIONALIS 225 (1936).
101. See R. H. Helmholz, The Roman Law of Blackmail, 30 J. LEGAL STUDIES 33
(2001) (discussing more fully the possible civil and criminal liability against the speaker).
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those that would accord with a more individualistic conception of
privacy. The commentators grounded the rights in biblical and formal
sources. Jesus himself had chosen not to reveal the treacherous
intentions of Judas Iscariot, although he certainly knew of them.
12
Public courts must do the same. In the world, the man who is guilty of a
secret crime must be tolerated; his punishment must be left to God.
Similarly, the reason most often given for the existence of a privilege not
to answer incriminating questions was that without the privilege, the
ordo iuris would be perverted. If a judge required a man to answer for
his secret faults, the judge would become an accuser, whereas under the
ordo, he was required to be an impartial adjudicator of fact and law. 3
The privilege existed, but the ius commune also allowed compelled
questioning of a person where the judge was not acting in the place of an
accuser. If a man were publicly defamed of a crime, he could be required
to answer incriminating questions because, in those circumstances, the
judge would not himself be acting as the accuser. The ordo would be
preserved.
In the same fashion, the law of iniuria admitted an exception for the
revelation of crimes in which the public had a legitimate interest. To say
truthfully that a man was a thief might not be wrongful, if the purpose of
the utterance was to promote the public need to detect and punish
crirminals.'0 ' Although the ius commune recognized a right of privacy, the
right became so hedged with exceptions that, in practice, it meant a good
deal less than it appeared to mean at first sight.
CONCLUSION
What conclusion emerges from this evidence? The evidence is far
from destroying the revisionist argument that the ius commune
recognized a number of basic human rights. Nor does it undercut the
assertion that many of the rights recognized by the ius commune were
quite similar to modern rights. The medieval rights found in the Roman
and canon laws by the medieval jurists were not just statements of ideals.
Individuals were given the power to exercise them; indeed, the rights
were exercised in fact. The evidence from the medieval ius commune
does, however, raise questions about the connection between medieval
and modem notions of natural human rights. The differences are as
102. C.2 q.1 c.6.
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significant as the similarities. In the medieval law, these rights were
based upon a purportedly objective assessment of the teachings of
natural law and the Christian religion. That is obviously much less true
of the natural human rights found in modern law. Modern rights are
grounded in conceptions of individual autonomy and human worth, and
this makes a significant difference in fact.
It is worthy of note how easily the rights that existed and, at first sight,
looked very like modem rights, were qualified substantially in the
medieval ius commune. Enforcement of the right of the poor to support
was reduced to the most extreme situation, and even then, it was
controversial. The right to marry freely was limited in its scope and its
consequences by the claims of church and family. The right to vote was
surrendered in large measure to the needs of the institutional church.
The right to religious liberty was largely overcome by a concern for the
objective validity of baptism. The right to be free from criminal
prosecution fell prey in many instances to the need to quiet fama publica
and to keep society free from crime. These human rights were effective
only so long as they comported with natural law and God's will. When
they threatened to become a barrier to justice or the needs of the church,
they gave way.
No rights are absolute; not today and not then. That a right may exist
without being absolute is evident in our understanding of the right to
self-defense. The legal right must co-exist with society's interest in
settling disputes peacefully. There is more, however, to the argument
than this obvious and elementary point. We have not entirely lost touch
with medieval ways of thinking about some of the rights we prize most
highly. For example, we treasure freedom of speech partly because we
believe that the government of our country will be improved if we
encourage the interchange of ideas and the fullest discussion of the
merits of those who govern us.1 5 The objective is good government; free
speech promotes it. The Second Amendment to the Constitution, the
now controversial declaration of the people's right to bear arms, is also
couched in terms of an objective right: the need of a functioning militia.
Moreover, something clearly akin to this way of thinking about rights has
been used by many of the advocates of granting greater legal protection
to the weak and the oppressed. Recognizing that the exercise of rights
by the powerful can subvert the true interests of society, advocates have
argued in favor of a more limited view of human rights, one that curtails
105. See Robert Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47
IND. L.J. 1, 20-35 (1971) (discussing, albeit in extreme form, this view of the freedom of
speech).
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the rights of some in the interests of the well-being of the many. Their
attitude would have been quite familiar to the jurists of the ius
106
commune.
However, adjusting human rights to fit the objective needs of society is
not the usual contemporary way of thinking about such rights. Today,
rights are often treated as part of a system based upon a respect for
personal autonomy17 Human rights are natural and inhere in
individuals.06 They require a broad freedom from external interference,
and except in extreme circumstances, they are not lost even when the
interests of society or a desire for justice seem to conflict with them.
More often than not, freedom of speech, the right to due process, and the
right of religious freedom are ends in themselves. They are prized
because they express the autonomy of the individual and are tolerated in
many situations where they appear to threaten the social fabric. It is a
measure of how dissimilar the human rights articulated in the ius
commune were from modern rights that medieval rights so often and
easily were sacrificed to meet the other needs of church and state.
Of course, many of the reasons given for the exceptions that were
carved out now seem like simple rationalizations - conclusions reached,
probably out of self interest, and justified by artificial invocations of
natural law and fanciful interpretations of Scripture. However, that view
does not represent the way the rights were perceived at the time. If
medieval law is to be understood, it must be viewed as it was by the
medieval jurists. Virtually all the conclusions drawn by those
commentators were entirely consistent with a designedly objective view
of rights. That approach was characteristic of medieval thought, and it
continued to be the dominant way of looking at rights well into the early
modern period. For that reason, although the revisionist scholarship has
undoubtedly made valuable contributions to understanding the historical
concept of human rights by unearthing its roots in the medieval ius
commune, it remains true to say that the creation of natural rights in the
modern sense of the term belongs as much to a later age as it does to the
Middle Ages.
106. E.g., Morton J. Horwitz, Rights, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 393 (1988). See
generally JOHN C. CALHOUN, THE RESTRAINT OF THE EXERCISE OF ONE'S RIGHTS
(1965).
107. Bork, supra note 105, at 8 (noting that rights are dependent upon "a general
principle of individual autonomy").
108. Horwitz, supra note 106, at 399-400 (suggesting that rights are "conceived in
radical individualism and continue to express an individualistic perspective").
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